

BEFORE THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARD  
CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGION  
STATE OF WASHINGTON

BRANDI BLAIR, MATTHEW BLAIR, BRETT  
BLAIR, JAMES BLAIR, LOWELL  
ANDERSON, DOUGLAS HAMAR, AND  
CHAD MCCAMMON,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF MONROE,

Respondent.

**CASE No. 14-3-0006c**

**ORDER ON CITY'S DISPOSITIVE  
MOTION AND PETITIONERS' MOTIONS  
TO SUPPLEMENT**

**I. CITY'S DISPOSITIVE MOTION**

This matter came before the Board on Respondent City of Monroe's dispositive motion timely received on April 22, 2014. The City challenged (1) the GMA standing of Petitioners Brandi Blair, Matthew Blair, Brett Blair and James Blair (the Blair Petitioners) for failure to participate in the legislative process of Ordinance Nos. 022/2013 and 024/2013, and (2) the SEPA standing of the Blair Petitioners for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies by commenting on or otherwise challenging the September 27, 2013 FEIS.<sup>1</sup> The City also challenged the SEPA standing of Petitioners Hamar and McCammon (the Hamar/McCammon Petitioners) for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies by appealing the September 27, 2013, FEIS. On May 2, 2014, the Board received separate Responses from the Blair Petitioners and from Hamar/McCammon Petitioners. The City replied on May 9, 2014.

As set forth below, the City's motion to dismiss the Blair Petitioners' GMA challenge is **denied**. The City's motion to dismiss the Blair Petitioners' SEPA challenge for lack of

<sup>1</sup> Respondent's Dispositive Motion Regarding Standing (April 22, 2014) at 1-2.

1 standing is **granted.**<sup>2</sup> City's motion to dismiss the Hamar/ McCammon SEPA challenge is  
2 **denied.**

## 3 4 **II. DISCUSSION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS**

5 WAC 242-03-555 allows for dispositive motions on a limited record to determine the  
6 standing of a petitioner to bring a challenge.

### 7 8 **A. Motion to Dismiss Blair Petitioners for lack of GMA standing**

#### 9 Requirements for GMA standing

10 Requirements for GMA standing are set out in RCW 36.70A.280(2), which provides  
11 in relevant part:

12 A petition may be filed only by: . . . (b) a person who has participated orally or  
13 in writing before the county or city regarding the matter on which a review is  
14 being requested . . . or (d) a person qualified pursuant to [the Administrative  
15 Procedures Act, as set out at] RCW 34.05.530.<sup>3</sup>

16 As the Central Board explained in *Lowen*, "These two means of obtaining standing  
17 are referred to as Participation (or Appearance) standing and APA standing."<sup>4</sup>

18 RCW 36.70A.280(4) further explains:

19 To establish participation standing under subsection (2)(b) of this section, a  
20 person must show that his or her participation before the county or city was  
21 reasonably related to the person's issue as presented to the board.  
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27 <sup>2</sup> The Board notes the standing of Lowell Anderson, a co-petitioner with the Blairs, is not disputed by the City.

<sup>3</sup> RCW 34.05.530 reads:

28 A person has standing to obtain judicial review of agency action if that person is aggrieved or  
29 adversely affected by the agency action. A person is aggrieved or adversely affected within the  
30 meaning of this section only when all three of the following conditions are present:

- 31 (1) The agency action has prejudiced or is likely to prejudice that person;  
32 (2) That person's asserted interests are among those that the agency was required to consider when it  
engaged in the agency action challenged; and  
(3) A judgment in favor of that person would substantially eliminate or redress the prejudice to that  
person caused or likely to be caused by the agency action.

<sup>4</sup> *Lowen Family Partnership v. City of Seattle*, Case No. 13-3-0007, Order of Dismissal (September 30, 2013)  
at 2.

1 Positions of the Parties

2 It is not disputed that the Blair Petitioners participated in the legislative process that  
3 led up to the City of Monroe's adoption of Ordinance No. 018/2012 in July 2012.<sup>5</sup> After the  
4 Hearing Examiner found the phased FEIS prepared in conjunction with that ordinance  
5 inadequate, the City repealed that ordinance and prepared a new FEIS and ultimately  
6 enacted the ordinances challenged in the instant case.<sup>6</sup> The City argues that the 2012  
7 legislative process was distinct from the 2013 process that culminated with the enactment of  
8 the challenged ordinances and that no comments received in the 2012 process were  
9 considered.<sup>7</sup> The Blair Petitioners counter that the City's own documents consistently list the  
10 East Monroe Development Group Comprehensive Plan Amendment and Rezone as  
11 "Continued from 2012," using reference numbers from 2011 (CPA 2011-01) and 2012  
12 (RZ2012-01).<sup>8</sup> They argue that the process should be treated as one matter which began  
13 with the application submittals in 2010 and culminated in the December 2013 adoption of  
14 the ordinances challenged here.<sup>9</sup> The Board notes the City does not deny Blairs'  
15 participation in the earlier process. Further, the record reflects the City's representations that  
16 the 2013 process was a continuation.

17 The City next concedes that "many of the comments, submittals, and other materials  
18 from the 2012 legislative process were variously analyzed . . . and/or were formally  
19 submitted into the legislative record" for the challenged ordinances, but that "there is no  
20 evidence" the Blair Petitioners' letter was one of the submittals considered.<sup>10</sup> The Board  
21 notes that here it is the City's burden, as the moving party, to prove that the letter was not  
22 considered.

23 **The Board finds** that the City has not met its burden to show that the Blair  
24 Petitioners did not participate in the legislative process.  
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30 <sup>5</sup> Respondent City of Monroe's Reply Regarding Dispositive Motion (May 9, 2014) at 1; Blair Petitioners'  
31 Response to Dispositive Motion (May 2, 2014) at 1.

32 <sup>6</sup> Respondent's Dispositive Motion Regarding Standing at 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.* at 3-4.

<sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Exs. 62, 64, 65, 69, 70, and 71: 2013 Planning Commission Agendas.

<sup>9</sup> Blair Petitioners' Response to Dispositive Motion at 4.

<sup>10</sup> Respondent's Reply Regarding Dispositive Motion at 7.

1 The City's motion to dismiss the Blair Petitioners for lack of GMA standing is **denied**.

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3 **B. Motion to Dismiss SEPA challenges**

4 **Participation Requirements under SEPA**

5 GMA standing does not automatically bestow SEPA standing upon a petitioner.<sup>11</sup>

6 WAC 197-11-545 (2) indicates the effect of not submitting comments to the lead  
7 agency during the SEPA comment period:

8 (2) **Other agencies and the public.** Lack of comment by ... members  
9 of the public on environmental documents, within the time periods specified  
10 by these rules, shall be construed as lack of objection to the environmental  
11 analysis, if the requirements of WAC 197-11-510 [Public Notice] are met.  
12 (emphasis added)

13 As this Board noted in *Shoreline III and IV*:<sup>12</sup>

14 One of SEPA's purposes is to ensure complete disclosure of the  
15 environmental consequences of a proposed action before a decision is  
16 taken.<sup>13</sup> Participation and objection to the environmental analysis is therefore  
17 a prerequisite to review of agency SEPA compliance.<sup>14</sup>

18 As explained by the Pollution Control Hearings Board:

19 Participation in public hearings, or commenting through the environmental  
20 review process are in some circumstances the only administrative remedy  
21 available to a party and thus are the forums in which exhaustion of remedies  
22 must occur in order for the party to later make a claim. See, *Citizens v.*  
23 *Mount Vernon*, 133 Wn.2d at 869. The very language of WAC 197-11-545(2)  
24 that "lack of comment" shall be construed as "lack of objection" to the  
25 environmental analysis assumes that a comment period is part of an  
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29 <sup>11</sup> *Master Builders and Brink v. Pierce Co.*, 02-3-0010, Order on Motion to Dismiss SEPA claims (October 20,  
30 2002) at 5.

31 <sup>12</sup> *Shoreline III and IV*, CPSGMHB Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c, Order on Dispositive  
32 Motions (January 18, 2010) at 6.

<sup>13</sup> *Kitsap County v. DNR*, 99 Wn.2d 386, 391 (1983); *King County v. Boundary Review Board*, 122 Wn.2d at  
663.

<sup>14</sup> *Citizens v. Mount Vernon*, 133 Wn. 2d 861, 869, 947 P.2d 1208 (1997). See also *Your Snoqualmie Valley v.*  
*Snoqualmie*, CPSGMHB Case No. 11-3-0012, Final Decision and Order (May 8, 2012) at 14.

1 available administrative process<sup>15</sup> that should be utilized by interested  
2 members of the public.<sup>16</sup>

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4 Positions of the Parties

5 The City asserts that the Blair Petitioners and the Hamar/McCammon Petitioners lack  
6 Participation standing under SEPA for failing to comment on or appeal the September 27,  
7 2013 FEIS.<sup>17</sup> The Blair Petitioners respond that they did participate because the SEPA  
8 process, as with the legislative process, was a continuation from the 2012 process in which  
9 the Hearing Examiner had ruled the City's original phased EIS to be inadequate.<sup>18</sup> In  
10 support of their assertion, the Blair Petitioners attest that the SEPA Checklist was not  
11 resubmitted because it was the same matter.<sup>19</sup> They also attest that City Planning  
12 Department employee Paul Popelka stated that "all previous comments and concerns were  
13 address [sic] with the new FEIS issued September 27, 2013," although they do not attach  
14 any documentary exhibit containing that evidence. However, the Hamar/McCammon  
15 Petitioners attach numerous documents not included in the City's Index due to the City's  
16 insistence that the Record only pertains to the 2013 Process.  
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19 In light of that fact, and the "he said, she said" record currently before it, the Board  
20 finds that the City, as the moving party here, has not carried its burden to show that the  
21 Petitioners do not have Participation standing under SEPA.

22 **The Board finds** that the City has not carried its burden to show that the Blair  
23 Petitioners and Hamar/McCammon Petitioners do not have Participation standing under  
24 SEPA.  
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29 <sup>15</sup> The Eastern and Western Growth Management Boards have interpreted participation in the SEPA comment  
30 process as necessary exhaustion of administrative remedies. See *Shoreline III and IV* at 6.

31 <sup>16</sup> *Spokane Rock Products v. Spokane County Air Pollution Control Authority*, PCHB Case No. 05-127, Order  
Granting Motion for Summary Judgment (February 13, 2006) at 10.

32 <sup>17</sup> City's Dispositive Motion Regarding Standing at 4, 7-8.

<sup>18</sup> Blair Petitioners' Petition For Review, Case 14-3-0006 (consolidated to 14-3-0008c)(February 27, 2014) at 2;  
Blair Petitioners' Response to Dispositive Motion at 7-8.

<sup>19</sup> Blair Petitioners' Response to Dispositive Motion at 11.

1 **Exhaustion Requirements under SEPA**

2 RCW 43.21C.075, entitled "Appeals," is the controlling provision in SEPA regarding  
3 standing to challenge environmental review.<sup>20</sup> Subsection (4) provides in part:

4 *If a person aggrieved by an agency action has the right to judicial appeal and*  
5 *if an agency has an administrative appeal procedure, such person shall, prior*  
6 *to seeking any judicial review, use such agency procedure if any such*  
7 *procedure is available, unless expressly provided otherwise by state statute.*  
8 *(emphasis added).*

9 The *Trepanier* court also noted that the term "person aggrieved" means one with  
10 standing to sue under RCW 43.21C.075(4).<sup>21</sup> In *Citizens for Clean Air v. Spokane*, the State  
11 Supreme Court reiterated that **RCW 43.21C.075(4) requires petitioners to first exhaust**  
12 **available administrative remedies**<sup>22</sup> and described the following four-part test for  
13 determining whether the exhaustion requirement bars a SEPA claim:

14 (1) whether administrative remedies were exhausted; (2) whether an  
15 adequate remedy was available; (3) whether adequate notice of the appeals  
16 procedure was given; and (4) whether exhaustion would have been futile.<sup>23</sup>

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18 **Positions of the Parties**

19 The Blair Petitioners concede that they did not appeal the FEIS but that co-petitioner  
20 Lowell Anderson did so appeal. Further, they state they felt their appeal was futile because  
21 they had "participation exhaustion"<sup>24</sup> and Mr. Anderson's appeal was unsuccessful. The City  
22 correctly counters that futility may not be based on the subjective belief that further appeals  
23 would be futile.<sup>25</sup> Further, the eventual denial of Mr. Anderson's appeal cannot *post hoc*  
24 justify the Blair Petitioners' failure to file their own timely appeal.  
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27 <sup>20</sup> The legislature has the authority to define and restrict standing. *Citizens for Clean Air v. Spokane*, 114  
28 Wn.2d 20, 29, 785 P.2d 447 (1990). The legislature has imposed standing restrictions in other land use  
29 provisions. See for example, the GMA standing provisions at RCW 36.70A.280(2), the Boundary Review  
30 Board Statute requirements at RCW 36.93.160(5), or the LUPA standing provisions at RCW 36.70C.060.

31 <sup>21</sup> *Trepanier v. Everett*, 64 Wn. App. 380, 382, 824 P.2d 524, 1992 Wash. App. LEXIS 66 (Wash. Ct. App.  
32 1992) (citing R. Settle, *The Washington State Environmental Policy Act* § 20(b), at 248 (1987); RCW 43.21C  
.075(4))

<sup>22</sup> *Citizens for Clean Air v. Spokane*, 114 Wn.2d 20, 26, 785 P.2d 447 (1990).

<sup>23</sup> *Id.*

<sup>24</sup> Blair Petitioners' Response to Dispositive Motion at 8.

<sup>25</sup> Respondent City of Monroe's Reply Regarding Dispositive Motion at 4.

1       **The Board finds** that the Blair Petitioners did not exhaust administrative remedies.

2       Next, the City asserts that the Hamar/McCammon Petitioners lack standing under  
3 SEPA to challenge the September 27, 2013 FEIS prepared in conjunction with the  
4 ordinances challenged in the instant case because they failed to exhaust administrative  
5 remedies by appealing the FEIS.<sup>26</sup> This is a more complex question because the  
6 Hamar/McCammon Petitioners allege that the City denied appellants Anderson and Rogers'  
7 request to add additional appellants.<sup>27</sup> Proposed Exhibit A39 includes a letter dated the  
8 same day as Anderson's timely appeal for the FEIS which, *inter alia*, makes such a request  
9 without specifying the name of parties who desired to join the appeal. Many of these  
10 documents are admitted to the record pursuant to the Order on Motions to Supplement  
11 (below). The City does not address the Hamar/McCammon contention that it was denied the  
12 opportunity to join the Anderson appeal of the FEIS, contending instead that these  
13 petitioners should have filed their own appeal. The Board is persuaded that the  
14 Hamar/McCammon Petitioners have demonstrated an effort to avail themselves of  
15 administrative remedies by requesting, through Lowell Anderson, to be added as appellants.  
16

17       The Board finds that, construing the limited record in favor of the non-moving party,  
18 the City has not carried its burden to show that the Hamar/McCammon Petitioners failed to  
19 exhaust an **available** administrative remedy.  
20

21  
22       **Injury to Interest Protected by SEPA**

23       The Central Board has long held that petitioners asserting SEPA standing must also  
24 satisfy the statutory provisions in the State Environmental Policy Act, which define the basis  
25 for appeal of a SEPA determination.<sup>28</sup>  
26

27       The Court of Appeals in *Trepanier* described a two-part test to establish standing –  
28 the Trepanier test – by which a "person aggrieved" can obtain judicial review under SEPA:

29       The courts apply a 2-part test in determining whether a person or entity has  
30 standing to challenge a SEPA determination. First, the interest that the  
31

32       <sup>26</sup> City's Dispositive Motion Regarding Standing at 8-9.

<sup>27</sup> Hamar/McCammon Response to Dispositive Motions at 3.

<sup>28</sup> See e.g., *Davidson Serles v. City of Kirkland*, CPSGMHB Case No. 09-3-0007c, Order on Motions (June 11, 2009) at 11.

petitioner is seeking to protect must be "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question"<sup>29</sup>. . . Second, the petitioner must allege an "injury in fact," *i.e.*, that he or she will be "specifically and perceptibly harmed" by the proposed action.<sup>30</sup>

Further, when a person alleges a threatened injury, as opposed to an existing injury, he or she must show an immediate, concrete, and specific injury to him or herself.<sup>31</sup> If the injury is merely conjectural or hypothetical, there can be no standing.<sup>32</sup>

### Positions of the Parties

The Blair Petitioners contend that RCW 36.70A.280(2)<sup>33</sup> allows the Board to recognize SEPA standing based on APA standing under RCW 34.05.530, **in lieu** of participation and exhaustion of administrative remedies, if the petitioners satisfy the requirement to show injury to a SEPA-protected interest.<sup>34</sup> The City replies that the *Trepanier* test is distinct from the exhaustion requirement.<sup>35</sup> The Board agrees with the City. It can find no authority to support the proposition that *Trepanier* intended to lay down an *alternative* test for standing. Rather, in those narrow circumstances outlined by the court in *Citizen*,<sup>36</sup> the Board and Courts may use the *Trepanier* test to insure that petitioners granted APA standing under RCW 34.05.530 have at least asserted an injury to a SEPA-protected interest. In *State v. Crediford*, the Washington Supreme Court said "...we are obliged to construe the statute in a way that is consistent with its underlying purpose and

<sup>29</sup> *Trepanier v. Everett*, 64 Wn. App. 380, 382, 824 P.2d 524, 1992 Wash. App. LEXIS 66 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (citing *Save a Valuable Env't v. Bothell*, 89 Wn.2d 862, 866, 576 P.2d 401 (1978)).

<sup>30</sup> *Id.* (citing *Concerned Olympia Residents*, 33 Wn. App. 677, 683, 657 P.2d 790 (1983)).

<sup>31</sup> *Id.*, citing *Roshan v. Smith*, 615 F. Supp. 901, 905 (D.D.C. 1985).

<sup>32</sup> *Id.*, citing *United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)*, 412 U.S. 669, 688-89, 37 L. Ed. 2d 254, 93 S. Ct. 2405 (1973).

<sup>33</sup> "A petition may be filed only by: . . . (b) a person who has participated orally or in writing before the county or city regarding the matter on which a review is being requested; . . . or (d) a person qualified pursuant to [the Administrative Procedures Act, as set out at] RCW 34.05.530."

<sup>34</sup> Blair Petitioners' Response to Dispositive Motion at 5-7.

<sup>35</sup> Respondent City of Monroe's Reply Regarding Dispositive Motion at 3.

<sup>36</sup> "(1) whether administrative remedies were exhausted; (2) whether an adequate remedy was available; (3) whether adequate notice of the appeals procedure was given; and (4) whether exhaustion would have been futile." *Citizens for Clean Air v. Spokane*, 114 Wn.2d 20, 26, 785 P.2d 447 (1990).



1 avoids constitutional deficiencies.”<sup>37</sup> The Board and Courts recognize the need for redress  
2 where administrative remedy was absent or inadequate in order to avoid constitutional  
3 deficiency. As noted *supra*, the Blair Petitioners have not shown that they lacked an  
4 administrative remedy. Where administrative remedy was adequate the Board will not  
5 undermine the purpose of the statutory GMA participation and SEPA exhaustion  
6 requirements by ignoring them.  
7

8 **The Board finds** that the Blair Petitioners cannot use the SEPA injury test to  
9 overcome their failure to exhaust *available* administrative remedies and thus cannot satisfy  
10 the standing requirements under the RCW 34.05.530.  
11

12 *Summary of Motion to Dismiss*

13 The City’s motion to dismiss the Blair Petitioners for lack of GMA standing is **denied**.

14 As to SEPA standing, except in extraordinary circumstances where petitioners show  
15 an inadequacy in the public notice and participation process, an inadequate administrative  
16 remedy, or administrative appeal was futile such that constitutional deficiencies must be  
17 cured, SEPA standing requires: (1) participation, (2) exhaustion of remedies, and (3) an  
18 injury to a SEPA-protected interest.  
19

20 Because the Blair Petitioners do not have SEPA standing, they are barred from  
21 bringing a challenge to the FEIS. The City’s motion to dismiss the Blair Petitioners’ SEPA  
22 challenge for lack of SEPA standing is **granted. However**, this is something of a moot point  
23 as the Blair Petitioners note,<sup>38</sup> because it is not disputed that co-petitioner Anderson has  
24 participation standing and exhausted his administrative remedies under SEPA by filing a  
25 challenge to the FEIS. The City has not challenged Mr. Anderson’s standing. As in *Your*  
26 *Snoqualmie Valley*,<sup>39</sup> the Board will grant review with respect to the petitioner who has  
27 standing.  
28

29 **The Board finds** that the Blair/Anderson petition will go forward.  
30

31 <sup>37</sup> *State v. Crediford*, 130 Wn.2d 747, 755, 927 P.2d 1129 (Wash. 1996); *See also In re Det. of Chorney*, 64  
32 Wn. App. 469, 825 P.2d 330 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (in order to pass constitutional muster, the statute must  
satisfy the requirements of due process).

<sup>38</sup> The Blair Petitioners’ Response to Dispositive Motion at 1.

<sup>39</sup> Case No. 11-3-0012 Final Decision and Order ( May 8 2012) at 17-19.

1 The City has not carried its burden to show that the Hamar/McCammon Petitioners  
2 do not have SEPA standing. The City's motion to dismiss the Hamar/McCammon  
3 Petitioners for lack of SEPA standing is **denied**.  
4

### 5 **III. MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD**

6 This matter comes before the Board on the Blair/Anderson Petitioners' Motion to  
7 Supplement the Record received April 22, 2014 and the Hammar/McCammon Petitioners'  
8 Motion to Supplement the Record filed the same day. The City filed its response on May 2,  
9 2014, and both sets of Petitioners filed replies on May 9, 2014.  
10

11 RCW 36.70A.290(3) states: "The Board shall base its decision on the record  
12 developed by the city, county, or state . . . ." The challenged city, county, or state  
13 government agency is required to submit an Index listing "all material used in taking the  
14 action which is the subject of the petition for review, **including materials submitted in**  
15 **public comment.**" WAC 242-03-510(1). Then the Board decides the case based on the  
16 parties' briefs and legal arguments, referencing exhibits that are contained in the record of  
17 the government's public process.  
18

19 WAC 242-03-565 permits the filing of motions to allow for evidence that supplements  
20 what is in the Index, providing:  
21

22 **Generally, the board will review only documents and exhibits taken**  
23 **from the record developed by the city, county, or state in taking the**  
24 **action that is the subject of review by the board** and attached to the briefs  
25 of a party. A party by motion may request that the board allow the record to  
be supplemented with additional evidence.

26 (1) A motion to supplement the record shall be filed by the deadline  
27 established in the prehearing order, shall attach a copy of the document, and  
28 **shall state the reasons why such evidence would be necessary or of**  
29 **substantial assistance to the board** in reaching its decision, as specified in  
30 RCW 36.70A.290(4). The board may allow a later motion for  
supplementation on rebuttal or for other good cause shown.

31  
32 (Emphasis added).

1 The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the evidence they wish to add is  
2 necessary or of substantial assistance to the Board. To satisfy this burden, the moving party  
3 should explain what is in the evidence that makes it relevant, how it is not available  
4 elsewhere in the record, and why consideration of the additional evidence would be  
5 necessary or particularly helpful to the Board. Proposed additions to the record “[t]o the  
6 extent [they] were **submitted to the jurisdiction as a part of the jurisdiction’s**  
7 **proceedings prior to the challenged action** . . . are presumed admissible subject to  
8 relevance.” WAC 242-03-510(3) (emphasis added).  
9

10  
11 Blair/Anderson Motion to Supplement

12 Petitioners Blair/Anderson, joined by Hamar/McCammon<sup>40</sup> move to supplement the  
13 record with various documents and correspondences related to the 2010-2012 legislative  
14 and environmental review process ultimately leading up to the adoption of the challenged  
15 action, including the March 29, 2012 Blair family comment letter and the City of Monroe  
16 Rezone Webpage. Although the City objects, the Board notes that the City has attached the  
17 comment letter to its own dispositive motion.<sup>41</sup> As regards most of the other materials, the  
18 City primarily objects to documents submitted prior to 2013.<sup>42</sup> As the Board noted in the  
19 preceding discussion regarding the Blair Petitioners’ GMA standing, the City’s own  
20 documents consistently list the East Monroe Development Group Comprehensive Plan  
21 Amendment and Rezone as “Continued from 2012,” using reference numbers from 2011  
22 (CPA 2011-01) and 2012 (RZ2012-01).<sup>43</sup>  
23

24 The Court of Appeals in *Clark County v. W. Wash. Growth Management Hearings*  
25 *Bd.*<sup>44</sup> supported the board’s authority to “reevaluate all the evidence in the record,” including  
26 not only the county’s index supporting its immediate resource lands designations (2007) but  
27 also the record of the previous long-term designations (2004). The Court rejected the  
28  
29

30  
31 <sup>40</sup> Hamar/McCammon Motion to Supplement at 3-5; Hamar/ McCammon Reply at 3-4.

<sup>41</sup> Blair/Anderson Motion to Supplement the Record at 1 and Attachment A to same.

<sup>42</sup> Respondent City of Monroe’s Response to Motions to Supplement the Record at 1.

<sup>43</sup> See, e.g., Exs. 62, 64, 65, 69, 70, and 71: 2013 Planning Commission Agendas.

<sup>44</sup> 161 Wn. App. 204, 235, 254 P.3d 862 (2011), *vacated in part on other grounds*, 177 Wn.2d 136, 298 P.3d 704 (2013).

1 County's argument that the Board may "consider only the portion of the evidentiary record  
2 highlighted by the County and is precluded from considering the entire evidentiary record."<sup>45</sup>  
3 Such restriction "would render meaningless the Growth Board's mandate to determine GMA  
4 compliance '*in view of the entire record before the board.*'"<sup>46</sup>

5 Accordingly, **the Board finds** that all documents from the City of Monroe's Index of  
6 the Record submitted October 16, 2012, in GMHB Case No. 12-3-0007 should be included  
7 as part of the record in the present case.  
8

9 The Blair/Anderson Petitioners also move to include a number of scientific reports  
10 and handbooks authored by state and federal agencies and/or research institutions, outlined  
11 in the supplementation table below, all of which were widely available during the 2010-2013  
12 process.<sup>47</sup> The City counters that the petitioners failed to submit these documents for review  
13 [in the 2013 process] and that Best Available Science is not a relevant consideration where  
14 the Board is not reviewing the City's designation of critical areas.<sup>48</sup> While the City may be  
15 technically correct that "best available science" as defined in WAC 365-195-900 is only  
16 specifically required for the designation of critical areas, it misses the crucial point that the  
17 scientific documents requested by the Petitioners were both widely available and of exactly  
18 the type the City would have been expected to consult in meeting its obligation to insure that  
19 all environmental impacts were adequately considered under SEPA.  
20

21 **The Board finds** the requested scientific reports will be of substantial assistance in  
22 determining whether the challenged actions comply with GMA and SEPA.  
23

24 Hamar/McCammon Motion to Supplement  
25

26 Petitioners Hamar/McCammon move to supplement the record with a LIDAR map of  
27 the East Monroe property, 1999 Topographical Survey and aerial photograph Figures 1-5.<sup>49</sup>  
28 To the extent that original versions of the petitioners' overlay figures existed and were  
29  
30

31 <sup>45</sup> 161 Wn. App. at 235-36.

32 <sup>46</sup> 161 Wn. App. at 236, citing RCW 36.70A.320(3) (emphasis in original).

<sup>47</sup> Blair/Anderson Motion to Supplement at 2-4.

<sup>48</sup> Respondent City of Monroe's Response to Motions to Supplement at 5-7.

<sup>49</sup> Exhibit H1, Hamar/McCammon Motion to Supplement at 2.

1 considered by the City during the 2010-2013 SEPA process, **the Board finds** that these  
2 documents are appropriately part of the record.

3 Petitioners also move to include Exhibit H2, a 1999 photograph of floodwaters in the  
4 East Monroe area, which Petitioners state “only recently came into our possession.” Not  
5 only is the Board unable to notice definite landmarks that would make the photographs  
6 useful for comparison purposes, the recent surfacing of the photograph almost certainly  
7 means it was not considered by the City.  
8

9 **The Board finds** that Exhibit H2 will not be of substantial assistance to the Board.

10 Similarly, Hamar and McCammon move to include evidence that the City required  
11 buttressing of an East Monroe residence due to slope instability in 2008. Petitioners have  
12 not shown that Exhibit H3 and H3a were submitted to the City for consideration prior to the  
13 challenged action and may not do so now.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, they move to supplement the record  
14 with an April 2014 *draft* Landslide Hazard Areas map currently before the Snohomish  
15 County Council in the wake of the Oso landslide. While the Board is extremely sensitive to  
16 the now-heightened concerns related to unstable slopes, it is nevertheless inappropriate to  
17 supplement the record with specific materials that could not have been considered by the  
18 City prior to the enactment of the challenged ordinance.  
19

20 **The Board finds** that Exhibit H3, H3a and H13 are not relevant in the instant case.  
21

#### 22 **IV. ORDER**

23 The City’s motion to dismiss the Blair Petitioners’ GMA challenge is **denied**.

24 The City’s motion to dismiss the Blair Petitioners for lack of SEPA standing is  
25 **granted**.  
26

27 The City’s motion to dismiss the Hamar/McCammon Petitioners for lack of SEPA  
28 standing is **denied**.  
29

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30 <sup>50</sup> WAC 242-03-565 reads:

31 Generally, the board will review only documents and exhibits taken from the record developed by the  
32 city ... in taking the action that is the subject of review...

\*\*\*

(2) Evidence arising subsequent to adoption of the challenged legislation is rarely allowed except  
when support by a motion to supplement showing the necessity of such evidence to the board’s  
decision concerning invalidity.

The Supplementation Table below indicates the ruling of the Board with respect to each of the documents requested for supplementation of the Record.

### Supplementation Table

Document	Petitioners	City	Order
Blair Family Comment Letter, March 29, 2012 & City of Monroe East Monroe Rezone webpage	Blair/Anderson request	Comment Letter Attached to City's Motion to Dismiss	Admitted
DOE email to Lowell Anderson Dec 10, 2013	Blair/Anderson request	In transcript of December 26, 2014 City Council Mtg	Already in record as Exhibit 85
NMFS Biological Opinion	Blair/Anderson request	Agrees	Admitted
DNR Geologic map of Monroe 7.5' quadrangle	Blair/Anderson request	Objects	Admitted
All documents from the City of Monroe's Index of the Record submitted October 16, 2012 in GMHB Case No. 12-3-0007	Exhibits A93-A120 as requested by Blair/ Anderson and Hamar/McCammon <sup>51</sup>	Objects	Admitted
Snohomish River Basin Salmon Conservation Plan June 2005	Blair/Anderson request	Objects	Admitted
DOE Focus on Flood Plan management Assistance Program March 2008	Blair/Anderson request	Objects	Admitted
NOAA & NMFS Health Floodplains January 2011	Blair/Anderson request	Objects	Admitted
FEMA Region 10 Floodplain Habitat Assessment & Mitigation Regional Guidance for the Puget Sound Basin August 2013	Blair/Anderson request	Objects	Admitted
Ecological Issues in Floodplains and Riparian Corridors, UW Center for Streamside Studies, July 2001	Blair/Anderson request	Objects	Admitted

<sup>51</sup> Hamar/ McCammon Motion to Supplement at 4-5.

1	WDFW Landscape Planning	Blair/Anderson	Objects	Admitted
2	for Washington's Wildlife:	request		
3	Managing for Biodiversity in			
4	Developing Areas 2009			
5	DOE & WDFW Wetlands in	Blair/Anderson	Objects	Admitted
6	Washington Vol. 1, March	request		
7	2005			
8	DOE & WDFW Wetlands in	Blair/Anderson	Objects	Admitted
9	Washington Vol. 2, April	request		
10	2005			
11	CTED Critical Areas	Blair/Anderson	Objects	Admitted
12	Assistance Handbook,	request		
13	Updated January 2007			
14	LIDAR map of East Monroe	Hamar/McCammon	Objects	Original
15	property, 1999 Topographical	request		20x33"
16	Survey and aerial photograph			versions
17	Figures 1-5			Admitted
18	Photo of East Monroe	Hamar/McCammon	Objects	Denied
19	Property in 1995 flood.	request		
20	"Hazards of a Steep Slope"	Hamar/McCammon		Denied
21	Exhibits H3, H3a	Request		Unless
22				part of
23				record for
24				12-3-0007
25	April 2014 Draft Snohomish	Hamar/McCammon	Objects	Denied
26	County Hazard Areas <sup>52</sup>	Request		

All supplemental exhibits which a party relies upon for its arguments shall be attached to the Hearing on the Merits briefs pursuant to WAC 242-3-620 and 565.<sup>53</sup>

The Board takes official Notice of Monroe Municipal Codes, the Monroe Shoreline Master Program and the Snohomish Countywide Planning Policy pursuant to WAC 242-03-630(4).<sup>54</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Exhibit H13: Hamar/McCammon Reply on Motion to Supplement at 2-3.

<sup>53</sup> "All evidence from the record which is to be relied upon at the hearing shall be submitted to the board and to the other parties with their briefs." "[The presiding officer may require] copies of supplemental exhibits to be attached also to the hearing on the merits brief."

<sup>54</sup> "The board or presiding officer may officially notice:

... (4) Counties and cities. Ordinances, resolutions, and motions enacted by cities, counties, or other municipal subdivisions of the state of Washington, including adopted plans, adopted regulations, and administrative decisions.

1 DATED this 23<sup>rd</sup> day of May, 2014.

2  
3  
4 Cheryl Pflug, Board Member

5  
6  
7 Margaret Pageler, Board Member

8  
9  
10 /Not available for signature/  
11 Raymond Paoella, Board Member